More on WMD

A followup on the last post, via Powerline:

[Georges Sada, second in command in Iraq's air force] has written a book, "Saddam's Secrets," that details how the Iraqi dictator used trucks, commercial jets and ships to remove his WMD from the country. At the time, the move went largely undetected, because Iraq pretended the massive movement of materiel was to help Syrian flood victims.

Nor is Sada alone. Ali Ibrahim, another of Saddam's former commanders, has largely corroborated Sada's story.

So how was Saddam able to use his "cheat and retreat" tactics without being found out? He had help, according to a former U.S. Defense Department official.

"The short answer to the question of where the WMD Saddam bought from the Russians went was that they went to Syria and Lebanon," said John Shaw, former deputy undersecretary of defense, in comments made at an intelligence summit Feb. 17-20 in Arlington, Va.

"They were moved by Russian Spetsnaz (special ops) units out of uniform that were specifically sent to Iraq to move the weaponry and eradicate any evidence of its existence," he said.


[The IBD article previously linked] could have added that we now know that Saddam trained thousands of terrorists at three or more training camps in Iraq, up to the beginning of the war in 2003. So the fear that Saddam might slip WMDs to terrorists for use in the U.S. was anything but far-fetched.

It is also important to note that only a tiny percentage of the documents left behind by Saddam's regime that potentially relate to WMD programs and support for terrorist groups, and only a tiny percentage of the audiotapes recorded in Saddam's office, have been translated. So far, we haven't even seen the tip of the iceberg; but even that has been enough to require the conventional wisdom to be re-evaluated. It seems virtually certain that there is much more to come on these subjects.

When the Iraq Survey Group reported that it was unable to find Saddam's WMDs, it was treated, understandably, as a huge news story. The news media interpreted the ISG's failure as undermining, to a great degree, the administration's case for the war. Fair enough. But now it appears that the administration, along with the CIA and the intelligence services of all other countries who assessed the issue, likely was right after all. Why isn't this equally big news?